Titelaufnahme

Titel
Does too much transparency of central banks prevent agents from using their private information efficiently? / Axel Lindner
BeiträgerLindner, Axel
ErschienenHalle (Saale) : Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2007 ; Halle, Saale : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, 2007
UmfangOnline-Ressource, 18 S.=178 KB, Text
Anmerkung
Zsfassungen in dt. und engl. Sprache
SpracheEnglisch
SerieIWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2007,16
URNurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-6304 
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Does too much transparency of central banks prevent agents from using their private information efficiently? [0.17 mb]
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This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge. -- transparency ; private information ; common knowledge