Titelaufnahme

Titel
Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation in both acquisition and sales in remanufacturing / Rainer Kleber/Marc Reimann/Gilvan C. Souza/Weihua Zhang
VerfasserKleber, Rainer ; Reimann, Marc ; Souza, Gilvan C. ; Zhang, Weihua
ErschienenMagdeburg : Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Der Dekan, [2019]
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten, 0,96 MB) : Tabellen, Diagramme
Anmerkung
Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 23-26
SpracheEnglisch
SerieWorking paper series ; 2019, no. 9
URNurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-117157 
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Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation in both acquisition and sales in remanufacturing [0.96 mb]
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We study the competition between two remanufacturers in the acquisition of used products and the sales of remanufactured products. One firm has a market advantage; we consider two separate cases where either firm could have an acquisition advantage. The problem is formulated as a simultaneous game on a market that is vertically differentiated in both acquisition and sales where both firms decide on their respective acquisition prices for used products and selling prices for remanufactured products. A key finding is that a market advantage is significantly more powerful than an acquisition advantage. The firm with a market advantage can preempt the entry of the other firm even if that firm has a significant acquisition advantage but not the other way around. This is accomplished through an aggressive acquisition strategy where the firm with a market advantage sets significantly higher acquisition prices.