![]() |
| Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar |
|
| | Nachweis | Kein Nachweis verfügbar |
|
| In Central Asia community water governance insttutons emerged and prevailed for a long tme. By employing an analytcal modelling approach using variants of the evolutonary HawkDove game we scrutnise three epochs' (pre-Tsarist Tsarist and Soviet) coordinaton mechanisms and qualitatvely compare them in the efciency spectrum. We fnd that the preTsarist community water governance setng due to its synergetc and pluralistc aspects was associated with higher efciency than the Tsarist and Soviet periods' setngs. The pre-Tsarist community arrangement linked irrigaton dutes with benefts. Our analytcal model reveals how the Tsarist Russian regulaton that replaced the electon-sanctoning element with a defacto system appointng the irrigaton staf and paying them fxed wages corrupted the wellestablished pre-Tsarist decentralised water governance. We term this move the "Kaufman drif". Resultng inadequacies in the water governance could have been averted either by restoring the community mechanism's electon-sanctoning atribute or else with an alternatve approach such as privatsing water resources. With the use of the "Krivoshein game " we produce an alternatve scenario for the region where we envisage the potental consequences of the water privatsaton. Modelling history might not disentangle the complex nature of water governance evoluton fully however the heuristcs we use in the analysis assist in guiding the diagnosis of the mater and its soluton. This makes our study well-tmed for contemporary Central Asia. The analyses assess current water management's chances to return to ancient principles of electon-sanctoning and perspectves of private irrigaton water rights. |
|
|