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Titel
Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems / Clemens Heuson. Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ, Department of Economics
VerfasserHeuson, Clemens
ErschienenLeipzig : Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ, 2013
UmfangOnline-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 7 S., 0,25 MB)
SpracheEnglisch
SerieUFZ-Diskussionspapiere ; 18/2013
SchlagwörterOnline-Publikation
URNurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-78972 
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Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems [0.25 mb]
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This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollu-tion problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less 'green' than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emis-sions. However the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmen-tal damages which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.