Who invests in training if contracts are temporary? : Empirical evidence for Germany using selection correction / Jan Sauermann
BeiträgerSauermann, Jan
ErschienenHalle : Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2006 ; Halle, Saale : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, 2006
UmfangOnline-Ressource (Text, 233 kB)
SerieIWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2006,14
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Who invests in training if contracts are temporary? [0.22 mb]
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored as well as for employee-sponsored training leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.