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Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt / Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
VerfasserColonnello, Stefano ; Curatola, Giuliano ; Hoang, Ngoc Giang
ErschienenHalle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), June 2016
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten, 1,19 MB) : Illustrationen
SpracheEnglisch
SerieIWH-Diskussionspapiere ; no. 20/2016
URNurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-57815 
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Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt [1.19 mb]
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We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt.