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Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt / Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
VerfasserColonnello, Stefano ; Curatola, Giuliano ; Ngoc Giang Hoang
ErschienenHalle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), June 2016
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten = 1,19 MB) : Illustrationen
SpracheEnglisch
SerieIWH-Diskussionspapiere ; no. 2016,20
URNurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-57815 
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Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt [1.19 mb]
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We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt.